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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Three sections of the Medical Benefits Recovery Act ("Act") 
are relevant, at least in part, to this appeal. They are: 
A. Assignment 
26-19-4.5. Assignment of rights to benefits. 
(1) (a) To the extent that medical assistance is actually provided to a 
recipient, all benefits for medical services or payments from a third party 
otherwise payable to or on behalf of a recipient are assigned by operation 
of law to the department if the department provides, or becomes obligated 
to provide, medical assistance, regardless of who made application for the 
benefits on behalf of the recipient. 
(b) The assignment: 
(i) authorizes the department to submit its claim to the third 
party and authorizes payment of benefits directly to the 
department; and 
(ii) is effective for all medical assistance. 
(2) The department may recover the assigned benefits or payments in 
accordance with Section 26-19-5 and as otherwise provided by law. 
(3) The assignment of benefits includes medical support and third party 
payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged by any court of this state or any 
other state or territory of the United States. That assignment is not in lieu 
of, and does not supersede or alter any other court order, decree, or 
judgment. 
(4) When an assignment takes effect, the recipient is entitled to receive 
medical assistance, and the benefits paid to the department are a 
reimbursement to the department. 
Vlll 
B. Recovery of Lien by the State 
26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third party - Lien -
Notice — Action - Compromise or waiver - Recipient's right to action 
protected. 
(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated to provide 
medical assistance to a recipient because of an injury, disease, or disability 
that a third party is obligated to pay for, the department may recover the 
medical assistance directly from that third party. 
(b) The department's claim to recover medical assistance provided as a 
result of the injury, disease, or disability is a lien against any proceeds 
payable to or on behalf of the recipient by that third party. This lien has 
priority over all other claims to the proceeds, except claims for attorney fees 
and costs authorized under Subsection 26-19-7(4). 
(2) The department shall mail or deliver written notice of its lien to the 
third party at its principal place of business or last known address. The 
notice shall include a recipient name, the approximate date of injury, a 
general description of the type of injury and, if applicable, the general 
location where the injury is alleged to have occurred. 
(3) The department may commence an action on its lien in its own name, 
but that lien is not enforceable as to a third party unless: 
(a) the third party receives written notice of the department's 
lien before it settles with the recipient; or 
(b)the department has evidence that the third party had 
knowledge that the department provided or was obligated to 
provide medical assistance. 
(4) The department may waive a claim against a third party in whole or in 
part, or may compromise, settle, or release a claim or lien. 
IX 
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an action by a 
recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or damage not included in 
the department's action. 
(6) The department's lien on proceeds under this section is not affected by 
the transfer of the proceeds to a trust, account, or other financial 
instrument. 
C. Recovery by Recipient - Attorney's Fees 
26-19-7. Action or claim by recipient -- Consent of department 
required -- Department's right to intervene - Department's interests 
protected - Attorney's fees and costs. 
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle, 
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of 
medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the department 
has provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance, without 
the department's written consent. 
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an action 
commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical costs connected with the 
same injury, disease, or disability, for which it has provided or has become 
obligated to provide medical assistance. 
(2) (a) If the recipient proceeds without the department's written consent 
as required by Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound by any 
decision, judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the 
claim or in the action. 
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party to 
which the proceeds were made payable all medical assistance which it has 
provided and retains its right to commence an independent action against 
the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3). 
(3) The department's written consent, if given, shall state under what terms 
the interests of the department may be represented in an action commenced 
by the recipient. 
x 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for 
attorney fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action 
that is commenced with the department's written consent. 
xi 
TURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The narrow issue before the Court is whether the trial court 
erred in interpreting 1f1f 18 and 19 of State Office of Recovery Services v. 
McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d 572 (Utah 2000). However, a number of 
other questions have arisen regarding McCoy that should be resolved to 
avoid further appeals. The Appellants therefore urge this Court to answer 
all reasonable questions related to McCoy interpretation so that hopefully 
this matter can be resolved once and for all on the next remand. 
1. Interpretation of McCoy [the "Fair Share Issue7']. 
Did the trial court err in failing to apply this Court's holdings in Houghton 
II and McCoy If If 18 and 19, which require the State to pay a share of a 
recipient's attorney fees where the State obtains Medicaid lien 
reimbursement from a third-party tort recovery procured by a recipient's 
attorney? 
[Note: this issue will sometimes be referred to as the "fair 
share issue "or the "fair share doctrine," which is simply a shorthand 
method of identifying Appellant's position on this appeal. "Fair share" 
-1-
herein means: "the State should pay its share of the attorney fees incurred 
by the recipient in procuring a third-party tort recovery from which the 
state obtains reimbursement of its lien."]1 
The appropriate standard of appellate review is "correctness," 
since this is a question of law (legal interpretation of a case holding), and 
this Court gives no deference to the trial court ruling. St Benedict's Dev. Co. 
v. St Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). 
2. Related Questions. 
A. Only When State Elects Direct Recovery? Does 
McCoy require the State to pay a share of a recipient's attorney fees only 
when the State elects to recover directly against a recipient? 
B. Must Recipient Expressly Exclude State Claim? Does 
McCoy require that the recipient expressly exclude the State's claim from 
any attempt to recover from a third party, in order for the recipient to be 
paid a fair share of his/her attorney fees by the State? 
C. Hire its Own Attorney? Should the State be required 
to pay a fair share of a recipient's attorney fees if it hires its own attorney? 
[I]t would be inherently unfair not to award attorney fees to 
McCoy. . ." McCoy at If 18. 
-2-
D. Consent? Should the recipient" obtain" or" request" the 
State's consent to bring the action, in order to be entitled to have the State 
pay its fair share of the recipient's attorney fees? 
E. Notice? Should the recipient be required to provide 
notice to the State of the third party action before the State is obligated to 
pay its fair share of a recipient's attorney fees? 
F. Cooperation? Should the right to the State's payment 
of its fair share of a recipient's attorney fees be dependent upon the degree 
of cooperation by the recipient? 
3. Discovery. Should the Appellants be given full 
discovery, without limitation, of all cases where the State obtained lien 
reimbursement from a third-party recovery procured by a recipient's 
attorney? 
ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - ISSUE PRESERVED 
On November 3, 2003, the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn 
entered this Order which led to this interlocutory appeal: 
Under the McCoy case holding and its supporting facts, the 
State of Utah must pay attorney fees in procuring its share of 
settlement proceeds where at a minimum an injured recipient 
of State medical assistance hires an attorney to recover 
damages from a third party, and the State elects to recover its 
claim directly from the recipient. . . . The holding of the McCoy 
case governs this case. Accordingly, each Class II 
-3-
representative and member must meet the requirements of 
paragraph 18 of the McCoy case as construed above. 
R. 1720 (emphasis added); see complete Order in Appendix 1. 
Judge Quinn's holding severely limits class recovery of attorney 
fees to the very few cases2 where the State elects to recover directly against 
the Medicaid recipient. Order, Nov. 3, 2003, R. 1720. This interpretation 
ignores 1119 which provides that "each method of recovery requires the State 
to pay its share of attorney fees" McCoy 1119 (emphasis added). Recipients 
would receive no attorney's fee contribution in the mass of cases where the 
State simply sends a lien notice to the third-party insurance carrier. 
(Appellant objection R. 1712: 24-25.) 
CONTROLLING CASE LAW 
1. Houghton v. Dept of Health, 2002 UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067 
(Utah 2002) ("Houghton IF). 
2. State Office of Recovery Services v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39,999 
R2d 572 (Utah 2000). 
3. Wallace v. Jackson, 972 P.2d 446 (Utah 1998). 
At one point, the State estimated these cases to be around 41 in 
total. R. 1737. 
-4-
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Notice of Claim in this case was originally served in July, 
1995, and the Complaint was filed on October 27, 1995. R. 1-47. The trial 
court certified two classes of plaintiffs on January 26, 1996. R. 98-101. The 
claims of the Class I Plaintiffs were mooted by the prior appeal.3 "Class II 
Plaintiffs" are Medicaid recipients who had: 1) third party liability ("TPL") 
claims, 2) retained attorneys to assist them in obtaining a recovery, and 3) 
received "settlements or judgments" from which the State's Medicaid 
reimbursement liens were paid. R. 82 If 1; 99-100. 
The matter has twice been to the Supreme Court and twice 
reversed, most recently in October, 2002. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 962 
P.2d 58 (Utah 1998) (reversing an attorney disqualification order); 
Houghton v. Dept of Health, 2002 UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067 (Utah 2002) 
(uHoughton 77"). The only issue remaining in Houghton II was the issue of 
the recipients' right to have the State pay its fair share of their attorney fees 
After Plaintiffs filed suit, a series of cases were decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court which narrowed this litigation down to 
one issue, i.e., the obligation of the State to pay a fair share of 
a recipient's attorney fees under McCoy. See, Wallace v. Jackson, 
972 P.2d 446 (Utah 1998); S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1998); McCoy; and Houghton II. This left only the Class II 
Plaintiffs remaining in the litigation. 
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under McCoy, on which this Court "reverse [d] the district court on the issue 
of attorney fees and remand[ed] for further discovery/' Houghton II, 11 10 
(emphasis added). This third appeal deals with an erroneous November 3, 
2003 ruling by Judge Quinn which misinterprets both Houghton II and 
McCoy. 
On April 28, 2003, Judge Nehring of the Third District Court 
held a hearing and denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, (R. 753-755) 
granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Add Class II Representatives (R. 808-918), 
and made rulings on other pending motions and matters. R. 1289. Judge 
Nehring also declined to rule on any discovery dispute between the parties 
at that time. Order, June 16, 2003,11 4. R. 1289. He rendered a detailed 
interpretation of McCoy
 7 which would allow the award of attorneys fees to 
virtually all Class II Plaintiffs under McCoy U1f 18, 19 (R. 1798: 83-86). 
The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn inherited this case from 
Judge Nehring. On September 29, 2003, Judge Quinn also heard oral 
argument on a new spate of motions which focused on the meaning of 
McCoy. Judge Quinn interpreted McCoy to allow attorney fees only under 
one of the literal circumstances of 11 18, i.e., only where the State has 
elected to recover directly against a recipient. R. 1719. Various discovery 
-6-
motions were denied. R. 1718-1722. Judge Quinn's decision had the effect 
of reversing Judge Nehring. 
At this point in the litigation, there have arisen disputes and 
claimed ambiguities about the meaning of McCoy. The objective of Class 
II Plaintiffs is to obtain a definitive ruling resolving all known points of 
disagreement about when a recipient is entitled to have the State pay its fair 
share of a recipient's attorney's fee. Discovery may then proceed with 
dispatch and indigent recipients will receive the compensation to which 
they are entitled. 
Very narrow discovery was allowed by Judge Quinn that related 
"solely to the class issues in this case and spans the period beginning on 
October 26, 1994 and ending on September 29, 2003." Order, Nov. 3, 
2003, R. 1720. Practically, this meant that discovery was allowed for only 
those very few cases estimated by the Sate at 41 cases, where literally the 
State elected to proceed directly against a recipient. Judge Quinn, therefore, 
applied the McCoy 11 18 criteria, without reference to 11 19. Plaintiffs 
disagreed that McCoy was limited only to If 18 cases and petitioned for this 
interlocutory appeal, which was granted. R. 1732. 
-7-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Case Pending Eight Years. This action was filed on 
October 27, 1995. R. 1. 
2. Class Certification in 1996. The Court executed an 
Order on or about January 29, 1996, certifying two classes. Only Class II 
Plaintiffs remain. Class II Plaintiffs are Medicaid recipients who: a) hired 
legal counsel, b) pursued third party personal injury claims against 
tortfeasors, and c) obtained a recovery from which the State obtained lien 
reimbursement. See Court Order of January 29, 1996, R. 100. The Class 
II Plaintiffs were not allowed a 33% offset as the State's share of attorney 
fees under McCoy. R. 1718-1722. 
3. State's Statutory Notification Procedures. The State 
has a statutory duty to notify third parties of its Medicaid lien claims. Utah 
Code Ann. §26-19-5(2) ("the department shall mail or deliver written 
notice of its lien to the third-party"). Medicaid application forms always 
request information about possible liable third parties, such as persons 
causing injury and their insurance companies. R. 82. Medicaid 
administrative personnel provide periodic lien updates to counsel. R. 82. 
4. State's Notice of Third Party Actions and 
Settlements; Consent Requested. The State had notice of the Class II 
-8-
Plaintiffs' personal injury claims, made demands for payment of the liens 
prior to settlement, and was paid significant monies. R. 82. The 
Memorandum in support of the motion for class certification stated: 
At some point, each injured person made a claim or demand for 
their damages upon potentially responsible third parties and/or 
the insurance company insuring those third parties. . . . The 
State defendants then made a demand and asserted a priority 
claim upon any monies offered or paid, to resolve these 
personal injury claims. . . . These demands or claims came in 
the form of, inter alia: letters of demand, notices, and/or claims 
filed in court. . . . Each class member paid or relinquished a 
significant portion of his or her TPL settlement or judgment to 
the State defendants to liquidate liens or claims made by the 
Department. 
R. 83 (emphasis added). The trial court granted the "plaintiffs' Motion for 
class certification as prayed." R. 100. In virtually all cases, the recipients 
had requested but were denied consent4 to represent the State's interest. 
R. 83. Each Class II plaintiff was ultimately successful in resolving the 
third party claim against the tortfeasor, which produced a settlement or 
judgment from which the State obtained lien reimbursement. R. 82, 100. 
5. Impact of State's Lien on Recipients. At some stage 
during the underlying litigation of the Class II Plaintiffs' claims, usually at 
the end when settlement was near or had been achieved, the State, typically 
In some cases, the request for consent was simply ignored by 
the State. This Brief treats an ignored request as a denial. 
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through the ORS, would serve notice that it was demanding full payment 
on its lien. R. 82-83. There was no contribution for a 33% attorney's fee 
in favor of the recipient, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) and 
McCoy. Virtually all attorneys receive a contingent fee on the gross recovery, 
with the recipient paying all medical bills and liens. R. 151 at n.6. 
Accordingly, if the State fails to pay its fair share of recipient's attorney 
fees, it costs the indigent Medicaid recipient (not the attorney) the amount 
the State should have contributed. 
6. No Discovery for Eight Years. Discovery was 
attempted in 1996, but never secured because the trial court disqualified 
counsel. After the first reversal, discovery was again attempted, but 
defendants refused to respond, and instead filed motions for a protective 
order and summary judgment. The State was granted Summary Judgment 
on November 13, 2000. R. 708. After the most recent reversal, discovery 
was again attempted on October 22, 2002, which has been met by multiple 
objections and motions for a protective order. R. 750. These motions and 
objections were based on narrow, literal interpretations of 11 18 of McCoy. 
These objections were largely overruled or denied by Judge Nehring as a 
trial court judge (R. 1096), but recently reconsidered and granted in large 
part by Judge Quinn. R. 1720. To date, not one single record of a 
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Medicaid lien of a Class II plaintiff has been produced during eight years of 
litigation. The November 3, 2003, Order denied any discovery except for 
that narrow band of Class II Plaintiffs identified in Paragraph 8 below. R. 
1720. 
7. State "Concedes" Error, Then Changes Its Tune. In 
the Houghton II appeal, the State purported to "concede" that the trial court 
had made an error in its interpretation of McCoy. See Houghton II, 11 10; R. 
773. 
8. Clarification of McCoy. Appellants, and probably this 
Court also, assumed that the State was conceding that the Class II Plaintiffs 
(as defined in the certification order, R. 98-100) were entitled to attorney 
fees. Because of the "concession," this Court did not discuss at length the 
meaning of McCoy. During the litigation that occurred after remand, it 
became clear that the State had actually "conceded" virtually nothing, as it 
was advocating a very narrow, literalistic interpretation of McCoy which 
would essentially destroy McCoy's applicability in the vast majority of cases. 
Had the State been more candid in Houghton II and addressed McCoy 
interpretation issues straight up, this third appeal might have been avoided. 
Hopefully, Houghton III will clarify and resolve the misinterpretations of 
McCoy, and get this case back on track toward resolution. 
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9. Trial Court's Narrow Reading of McCoy. The trial 
court held in the November 3, 2003, Order, that 11 18 of McCoy limits class 
recovery to a narrow range of cases where the State elects to recover directly 
against the recipient. The trial court thus ignores 11 19 of McCoy, which 
specifically holds that "each method of recovery requires the State to pay its 
share of attorney fees," including where the State takes the action directly 
against the third party, or grants its consent, or refuses its consent and seeks 
directly against the recipient after the third-party recovery. McCoy 11 19 
(emphasis added). 
10. Interlocutory Order Appeal Granted. Plaintiffs' 
Petition for Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order filed on November 
21, 2003, was granted by this Court on January 15, 2004. R. 1732. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred when it failed to apply this Court's 
holdings in McCoy and Houghton II and the statutory framework, which 
require the State to pay a fair share of a recipient attorney's fee where the 
State recovers its lien from a third-party tort recovery produced by a 
recipient's attorney. Further, McCoy did not require as a condition 
precedent to the State paying its fair share that the State first elect to 
recover directly from the recipient. To impose such a requirement upon the 
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recipient would so narrow McCoy as to destroy its beneficial effect for the 
large mass of recipients. It would also be contrary to the public policy of 
requiring the State to pay its fair share of the cost of procuring its lien 
reimbursement. Additionally, without State contribution of its fair share 
of the cost of procuring a settlement, many third party cases would never 
be brought, resulting in the State recovering less by way of lien 
reimbursements. 
McCoy requires that "each method of recovery requires the State 
to pay its share of attorney fees." McCoy 11 19 (emphasis added). This is 
fair and is an excellent public policy. 
There are other McCoy interpretation issues that have been 
raised by the State, such as whether the State may avoid its fair share by 
using "its own attorney," whether "consent" is necessary, what "notice" 
suffices, and the amount of "cooperation" necessary. None of these issues 
should be used to defeat Class II Plaintiffs from receiving a fair share 
contribution of their attorneys fees from the State where the State receives 
lien reimbursement because of settlements procured by recipients. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Procuring a Recovery Entitles Recipients to A Fair Share 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY 
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND THIS COURT'S 
HOLDINGS IN McCOY AND HOUGHTON II, WHICH 
REQUIRE THE STATE TO PAY ITS FAIR SHARE OF 
THE ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED BY THE RECIPIENT 
IN "PROCURING" A THIRD PARTY TORT RECOVERY 
FROM WHICH THE STATE OBTAINS REIMBURSE-
MENT OF ITS LIEN. SOUND PUBLIC POLICY 
LIKEWISE REQUIRES THE STATE TO PAY ITS FAIR 
SFIARE. 
A. Introduction. 
There have been a lot of "cooks in the kitchen" in this case. 
This matter has been in the courts for eight years, including two appeals to 
the Utah Supreme Court and assignment to at least three district judges. 
There is unnecessary confusion regarding the meaning of McCoy. 
Appellants believe Houghton III should address and resolve all reasonable 
interpretation questions in order to avoid further appeals. The key issue in 
this appeal is whether "procuring a settlement" by the Class II recipients, 
from which the State obtained lien reimbursement, triggers the State's 
obligation to pay its fair share of a recipient's attorney fees. 
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B. Construction of the Relevant Statutes. 
Whether "procuring a settlement" triggers the State's obligation 
to pay attorney fees under McCoy must be considered in light of the 
statutory framework. The Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 26-19-1 et seq., is the relevant statute. There are three key sections of the 
Act that are crucial in understanding McCoy and the State's obligation. 
First the starting point for analyzing the Act is U.C.A. §26-19-
4.5, titled "Assignment of Rights to Benefits." That provision makes it very 
clear that "to the extent that medical assistance is actually provided" to a 
recipient, the recipient assigns to the State "by operation of law" the right 
to recover those benefits from a third party. The assignment authorizes the 
State to submit its claim directly to, and receive repayment directly from, 
that third party. The assignment statute then refers specifically to U.C.A. 
§ 26-19-5 as the method by which the State may collect those assigned 
benefits. U.C.A. § 26-19-5(2) (". . . may recover the assigned benefits . . . 
in accordance with Section 26-19-5 "). 
Second, Section 26-19-5, which is the method by which the 
State may collect its lien, specifically protects the right to attorney fees. It 
provides the State strong and pervasive collection tools, particularly when 
read in conjunction with the Wallace, S.S., McCoy and Houghton II cases. 
-15-
This section and the relevant case law provide a statutory first dollar 
priority lien, which is legally unassailable (Subsection (1) (b): "priority over 
all other claims to the proceeds. . ."). The Wallace case held that the 
injured recipient does not even have a right to the proceeds "until after 
. . . reimbursement to the State for Medicaid benefits". Wallace, 972 P.2d 
at 448 (emphasis added). Attorney fee claims are the single delineated 
exception to the State's iron-clad priority lien under § 26-19-5: 
The department's claim to recover medical assistance provided 
as a result of the injury, disease, or disability is a lien against 
any proceeds payable to or on behalf of the recipient by that 
third party. This lien has priority over all other claims to the 
proceeds, except claims for attorney's fees and costs authorized 
under Subsection 26-19-7(4). 
§ 26-19-5(l)(b) (emphasis added). 
Third. Subsection 5(l)(b) leads to Subsection 26-19-7(4), 
which is the last area necessary in order to understand McCoy and the rights 
of the Class II Plaintiffs.5 How is Subsection 26-19-7(4) to be applied? 
McCoy answered that question, interpreting the subsection to require the 
5 
The rest of § 26-19-7 deals with the rights and duties of the recipient 
in pursuing the State's lien for medical assistance paid, when the 
recipient has "consent" from the State to pursue that claim. Except 
for the attorney fees subsection which is incorporated by reference in 
§ 5, § 7 does not apply to this case. 
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payment of a thirty-three percent (33%) attorney fee when the recipient, 
through an attorney, recovers a settlement from which the State's lien 
against "any proceeds payable to . . . the recipient" is paid. Accordingly, 
McCoy held "that under subsection (4) , . . . the State must pay the attorney 
fees incurred in procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds." 
McCoy If 18. 
Understanding these statutory provisions assists greatly in 
understanding the rights of Class II Plaintiffs under McCoy. In essence, the 
State has an unassailable priority lien, except for the Subsection 7(4) 
attorney fees, which statutorily trumps the State's priority lien. This insight 
was obviously important to the McCoy court in determining that recipients 
providing the State a means to recover its lien are entitled to have the State 
pay a share of their attorney fees. 
C. McCoy Frames the Issue. 
In McCoy, this Court squarely faced the fair share question and 
framed the issue as follows: 
Finally, McCoy argues that if the State is entitled to recover 
from the settlement proceeds, he is entitled to recover attorney 
fees from the State for procuring the settlement. The State 
contends that McCoy is not entitled to attorney fees under the 
Act because he lacked consent to bring an action on the State's 
behalf. 
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McCoy If 13 (emphasis and double emphasis added). Simply put, could the 
recipient "recover attorney fees . . . [from the State] for procuring the 
settlement?" Id. The McCoy holding reads in pertinent part: 
We therefore conclude that under subsection (4), when the 
State elects to recover directly from a recipient who has 
expressly excluded the State's claim from any attempt to 
recover from a third party, the State must pay the attorney fees 
incurred in procuring the State's share of the settlement 
proceeds. 
In sum, while the Act provides discretion to the State when 
selecting a suitable avenue for recovering medical assistance, 
each method of recovery requires the State to pay its share of 
attorney fees. The State may (1) take action directly against 
the third party, for which the State pays its own expenses; (2) 
grant consent to recipients seeking to pursue the State's claim, 
whereby the State's recovery will be reduced by reasonable 
attorney fees and, if any, its proportionate share of the costs of 
an action; or (3) refuse consent and proceed against the 
recipient after the recipient recovers from the third party, in 
which case the State's recovery shall be reduced by reasonable 
attorney fees. 
McCoy IfU 18, 19 (emphasis added). Thus, "each method of recovery 
requires the State to pay its share of attorney fees," regardless of the method. 
Id. 11 19. 
D. Houghton II Reversed Trial Court on Attorney Fees Issue. 
The fair share issue was before the Houghton II court on appeal. 
In Houghton II, the defendants claimed that the Class II claims for attorney 
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fees were properly dismissed because "no named plaintiff had such a claim." 
Brief of Appellees in Houghton II, p. 13. The Houghton II opinion recounts 
the history of the attorney fees claim, but rejects the defendants' arguments 
and spin. Houghton II % 5. The State then "conceded" on appeal: 
[T]hat the district court erred in dismissing Class II Plaintiffs' 
claims with prejudice, . . . . The parties therefore agree that 
the district court erred with respect to the attorney fees issue; 
they differ only in the remedies they propose. 
Id. 11 9 (emphasis added). The State suggested to the Houghton II court that 
even though it was error to dismiss the Class II claims, the error was not 
prejudicial. Id. 11 10. The Supreme Court rejected this and "therefore 
reverse [d] the district court on the issue of attorney fees and remand[ed] for 
further discovery.79 Id. 11 10 (emphasis added). Thus, the Houghton II court 
apparently assumed the right to attorney fees was resolved because it 
anticipated that the case would be remanded "for further discovery" on the 
Class II claims under McCoy. Obviously, this discovery would be for each 
lien recovery by the State which was procured by the recipient's settlement 
of the tort claim. 
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E. State's Fost-Houghton II Interpretation of McCoy. 
The State now claims, post-Houghton II, that McCoy has a very-
narrow application, based on 11 18 alone.6 These claims have at least three 
prongs. First, it contends that the only valid plaintiffs in this litigation are 
those from whom the State seeks to recover directly (as opposed to seeking 
recovery from the third party tortfeasor or its insurance company, which the 
State asserts are not"McCoy-type claims"). R. 763. Second, the State claims 
that the recipient must have expressly excluded the State's claim from the 
attempt to recover from the third party. R. 763. Third, the State claims 
The State has remained critical of this Court's statutory 
interpretation of the Act and refuses to acknowledge the McCoy 
holding: "You know, I would assume [The Supreme Court] justices are 
fallible, right? They make mistakes" R. 1798 at 33:12-13. In 
explaining why the exclusion provision of 1f 18 is missing from 11 19 
of McCoy, the State suggests a printing error (R. 1798:21) and 
continues: "MR. COMBE [addressing Judge Nehring] There may not 
be, maybe the court just felt it was unfair. I believe the court tried to 
fashion a remedy here. They turned the statute upside down, I 
believe, and in doing so they made it - let me just put it his way - that 
is actually a bad case law, but I think this is an excellent example 
where you have bad facts and you have the court trying to fashion a 
remedy and it causes a real problem for everyone from that point on 
trying to understand this decision [McCoy], Because if you'll look at 
the statute, the court's interpretation of that statute is at least 
questionable. The way they've interpreted that statute as far as the 
attorney fees and where the comma is at and so forth." Oral 
Argument, Judge Nehring, April 28, 2003, 30:23-31:9, R. 1798 (all 
quotes, emphasis added). 
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that the attorney fees contribution may be entirely avoided by the artifice 
of the State using "its own attorney." R. 765. For example, according to 
the State, if an ORS lawyer writes a lien claim letter to the tortfeasor's 
insurance carrier, and waits for payment until settlement at the end of the 
case, no attorney's fee contribution is owed. The rationale: the State would 
not be "claiming against the recipient," but would be claiming "directly 
from" the insurer, for which no fee is owed under its literal interpretation 
of McCoy. R. 765. Under the State's view, it can entirely avoid paying an 
attorney's fee by this simple device. The November 3rd Order of the trial 
court (Judge Quinn) basically sustains the State's position. R. 1720. 
F. Tudge Nehring: McCoy Allows Recovery. 
On April 28, 2003, Judge Nehring heard the State's argument 
for a protective order based on its narrow interpretation of McCoy set forth 
above, and rejected it. He stated: 
Let's turn to McCoy. Here's how I read McCoy. First, the 
essence of the lesson of McCoy is contained in paragraph 19 
and what paragraph 19 does, as I interpret it, is the following; 
first, it implies notice at some point to the State of a recipient's 
claim, and the reason that it implies that is that paragraph 19 
spells out three options that the State may have. Two of those 
options directly address notice in the sense that they expressly 
refer to a grant of consent or a refusal of consent. So in those 
two instances, there is a direct reference to some kind of notice. 
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Next, in a situation, in a setting in which the State refuses 
consent and there is notice, an attorney's fee claim is available 
as a matter of law. . . . I expressly find that to recover under 
McCoy, a recipient's attorney does not have to exclude the 
amount of the State's lien from the claim made against the tort 
feasor and the reason that I find that is that there is no -1 find 
no persuasive rationale to make that kind of requirement. It 
just doesn't make sense to me. So, defendant's motion to 
dismiss is denied with respect to McCoy. 
MR. COMBE: Your Honor, as far as McCoy is concerned, you 
didn't indicate whether or not it would be a requirement to 
recover directly from the recipient as opposed to a third party. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Absolutely not, absolutely not. 
MR. COMBE: Absolutely not what? 
THE COURT: Attorney fees are available irrespective of 
whether the State recovers from the recipient or from the third 
party, in my view. That falls into a matter of how much and 
not whether. What I won't - what I can't in good conscience -
and this would be I guess a result or in a decision to, some 
might say, is to countenance the situation in which the check 
is cut from the carrier to the State and the State says, we're not 
paying anything. Huh-uh, that's not going to happen. And so 
in those types of situations, the inquiry is going to be, how 
much is a recipient's lawyer entitled to for that piece of 
recovery? I can't read McCoy to conclude that in those 
situations the recipient is out for attorney's fees as a matter of 
law. No, that doesn't happen. As long as there is notice, if 
there is notice and if there is an attorney, the door is open and 
the inquiry is into, "Alright, so how much is it worth? How 
much are the attorney's fees going to be?" That's the lesson of 
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paragraph 19 at least until somebody tells me differently. 
Okay. 
R. 1798 at 83:12-86:8 (emphasis added). 
G. Trial Court's Erroneous Ruling. 
Judge Quinn, in the September 29, 2003 oral argument, 
specifically rejected Judge Nehring's earlier interpretation of the essence of 
the McCoy case being 1119, stating instead that the holding was found in the 
last sentence of 11 18. He held: 
Under the McCoy case holding and its supporting facts, the 
State of Utah must pay attorney fees incurred in procuring its 
share of settlement proceeds where at a minimum an injured 
recipient of State medical assistance hires an attorney to 
recover damages from a third party, and the State elects to 
recover its claim directly from the recipient. 
The holding of the McCoy case governs this case. Accordingly, 
each Class II representative and member must meet the 
requirements of paragraph 18 of the McCoy case as construed 
above. 
R. 1720. Accordingly, the trial court granted a motion for protective order 
as to any discovery on cases other than ones where the State tries to recover 
directly from the recipient. 
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H. Analysis. 
McCoy is clearly not to be so narrowly construed as to limit its 
scope to cases where the State "elects to recover its claim directly from the 
recipient." McCoy 1118. A broader view is justified by a reasonable reading 
of McCoy or ordinary logic. Also, such a reading would so narrow the scope 
of McCoy that virtually no recipient would ever be entitled to a share of 
attorney fees for recovering the State's lien. 
The McCoy Court's framing of the issue helps in the 
interpretation of the holding. It framed the issue as whether the recipient 
was "entitled to recover attorney fees from the State for procuring the 
settlement/7 McCoy 11 13 (emphasis added). The State claimed no such 
entitlement because it didn't give its consent. Id. McCoy interpreted the 
statute in question, Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1995), as having two 
parts, one dealing with attorney fees and one dealing with costs. McCoy 
could not collect costs because he didn't actually file "an action," but there 
was no such requirement for collecting fees, and the statute didn't limit the 
collection of fees to one who obtained consent. McCoy 1IH 16, 17, 18. In 
rejecting the State's claim that the attorney fees portion of subsection (4) 
should be limited to those who obtain consent, the Court noted: 
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We see no justification for so limiting the relatively broad 
reach of subsection (4) in the case before us. 
McCoy If 18 (emphasis added). Two sentences after describing the statute 
as having a "relatively broad reach/' this Court applied the law to the 
specific McCoy facts: 
We therefore conclude that under subsection (4), when the 
State elects to recover directly from a recipient who has 
expressly excluded the State's claim from any attempt to 
recover from a third party, the State must pay the attorney fees 
incurred in procuring the State's share of the settlement 
proceeds. 
McCoy If 18. Judge Quinn relied on this language exclusively. 
The above passage is clearly the application of the rule of law 
to the specific facts of McCoy, or a case-specific "holding." However, that 
language is immediately followed by the more general holding: 
In sum, while the Act provides discretion to the State when 
selecting a suitable avenue for recovering medical assistance, 
each method of recovery requires the State to pay its share of 
attorney fees. The State may (1) take action directly against 
the third party, for which the State pays its own expenses; (2) 
grant consent to recipients seeking to pursue the State's claim, 
whereby the State's recovery will be reduced by reasonable 
attorney fees and, if any, its proportionate share of the costs of 
an action; or (3) refuse consent and proceed against the 
recipient after the recipient recovers from the third party, in 
which case the State's recovery shall be reduced by reasonable 
attorney fees. 
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McCoy 1f 19 (emphasis added). This latter expression seems obviously 
intended to state the general rule of law and help courts apply McCoy to 
future cases.7 
Under If 19, particularly read in conjunction with the whole 
context of this case, "each method" the State uses to obtain recovery of its 
lien would require the payment of attorney fees, as long as the attorney 
"procur[ed] the settlement." McCoy IT 13. The Court noted: 
In fact, it would be inherently unfair not to award attorney fees 
to McCoy, who has followed the requirements of the Act in 
securing a recovery on behalf of his client. 
McCoy If 18 (emphasis added). It should be noted that "McCoy failed to 
keep the State minimally informed." McCoy 11 18, fh. 4. However, that did 
not prejudice the State which nonetheless recovered its lien. The operative 
fact that entitled him to fees was "securing the recovery on behalf of his 
client." McCoy 1f 18. 
7 
As noted by Judge Nehring, referring to combinations of facts not 
addressed in McCoy, it is foreseeable that a number of scenarios 
(other than the three non-exclusive examples listed in paragraph 19 
of McCoy), will arise in the future: [Judge Nehring]: "But what we do 
know is that the court doesn't talk about combo options. In other 
words what happens if the State - [MR. COMBE]: If the State files 
its own action then turns around and goes after the recipients? [THE 
COURT]: Right. [MR. COMBE]: Your're correct." R. 1798 at 36:7-
12. 
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For the trial court to focus on the last sentence of 11 18 as the 
holding, and to accordingly limit discovery to the narrow band of plaintiffs 
there described, ignores the forest for a single tree. It focuses solely on one 
sentence and ignores the next. It ignores the very specific language that 
"each method of recovery requires the State to pay its share of attorney 
fees." McCoy 11 19. It ignores the fact McCoy got a fee even though the 
State had no notice of the final settlement, that as a result the State lost its 
claim against the third party and that McCoy was uncooperative and failed 
to keep the State even "minimally informed." McCoy got his fee because 
he secured a "recovery on behalf of his client," and the State was paid, so 
his "lack of forthrightness did not prejudice the State's claim." McCoy 1f 18, 
fn. 4 (emphasis added). 
Lastly, the trial court's holding ignores the basic logic and 
rationale of McCoy, which is simply that the main issue is whether or not 
the State gets a recovery as a result of a settlement procured by 
recipient's counsel. If the State gets a recovery, it has not been prejudiced 
by anything that goes on, i.e., lack of notice, lack of consent, lack of 
forthrightness, etc. The theory here is that the State received its lien 
payment because a recipient's attorney procured a settlement. It does 
not matter whether the State allegedly used its own counsel, did not give 
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consent, was not fairly dealt with, did not receive notice, etc. A recipient's 
attorney produced the settlement/judgment; the recipient is entitled to have 
a share of his/her attorney's fee paid by the State. That's fair. 
A serious injustice would be done if this Court were to allow 
Judge Quinn's interpretation to stand. There will almost never be a case 
where the State will pay its fair procurement costs of obtaining lien 
reimbursement by the efforts of a recipient's attorney. All the State would 
have to do, as it does in almost all cases at present, is send a "notification 
of lien" to the third-party tortfeasor or its insurance carrier. The State 
simply waits until the case is settled or tried and collects its lien with de 
minimus effort. It contributes nothing to the process. Under the State's 
view, as sustained by Judge Quinn, the State would owe no attorney fees 
because it did not "recover directly from a recipient." 
As a practical matter, these interpretations would essentially 
provide the State with a "free ride," since a recipient's counsel basically does 
all the work, and the State gets its lien paid when the case is resolved.8 
8 
Free ride would be the last ride when attorneys discover there is no 
incentive to take a recipient's case if all proceeds are taken by the 
State. Because the State seldom files suit to collect from the third 
party, the winner in Judge Quinn's holding would be the insurance 
companies who are never pursued. 
-28-
McCoy stands for the proposition that the State should pay its fair share of 
recipient's attorney fees for the "free ride." This proposition is fair and 
should be upheld by this Court. 
POINT II 
No Requirement to Proceed Directly Against Recipient 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK DOES 
NOT CONTAIN ANY REQUIREMENT THAT THE 
STATE MUST ELECT FIRST TO PROCEED DIRECTLY 
AGAINST THE RECIPIENT BEFORE BEING LIABLE 
FOR ITS FAIR SHARE OF RECIPIENT'S ATTORNEY 
FEES. SUCH A LIMITATION ON McCOY IS 
ILLOGICAL, DESTRUCTIVE OF PUBLIC POLICY AND 
UNJUST. 
A. No Statutory Basis. 
There is no statutory requirement that the State elect to recover 
its claim directly from the recipient before being liable to pay its fair share 
of a recipient attorneys fees. That happened to be a background fact in 
McCoy that was mentioned by the Court in conjunction with its case-
specific holding. This has been misinterpreted by the trial court as an 
absolute sine qua non for the recipient to recover a fair share of his/her 
attorney fees from the State. There is no indication either in the statute or 
McCoy that this is intended. 
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The statutory framework discussed above in Point LB. makes 
this very clear. Section 26-19-5 states that the State's lien has priority 
"over all other claims to proceeds, except claims for attorney's fees . . . 
under § 26-19-7(4)." This applies broadly to proceeds "payable to . . . the 
recipient," not necessarily in the recipient's possession. § 26-19-5(l)(b). 
Thus, the recipient is entitled to a share of attorney fees even if the money 
is still held by a third party, as long as it is "payable to . . . the recipient," 
such as when a settlement is pending. 
However, Judge Quinn's holding at R. 1720 adopts a 
construction of McCoy that assumes that the recipient already has the funds 
in his/her possession because the State is proceeding "directly against the 
recipient" to get its lien repaid. So, the only way that a recipient would be 
entitled to have the State pay its share of the attorney fees is if recipient is 
already in possession of the money. But this contradicts the statute which 
says just the opposite, i.e., that Subsection 7(4) allows attorney fees when 
the proceeds are merely "payable to" the recipient. 
B. Trial Court's Construction is Illogical and Counterproductive. 
Judge Quinn's interpretation is terribly illogical because it 
would reward error and disadvantage those who do it right. The only 
reason that the recipient would be in possession of the settlement funds, 
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therefore forcing the State to pursue the recipient "directly," would be if the 
recipient had in essence wrongfully or erroneously acquired them. The 
State has a statutory first dollar priority lien on the proceeds, and they 
cannot legally be paid to the recipient without first paying the State's lien. 
Therefore, there is never a reason for the recipient or any third party 
insurance carrier, to not provide notice and acknowledge the State's statutory 
lien unless there is some error or illegitimate action or motive. 
Nor is there ever a reason for the State, with such a strong 
statutory position, to voluntarily allow the funds to come into the possession 
of the recipient. The third party has a statutory obligation to pay them 
directly to the State and would risk paying twice if it did not pay the State 
directly. The State regularly sends out lien notices to third party tortfeasors 
and their insurance companies in order to protect its interests. 
The upshot is simply that for the recipient ever to have the 
settlement funds so that the State would elect to proceed directly against 
the recipient is very rare, and could only occur by some gross error or 
illegitimate action. Yet Judge Quinn's holding says, in essence, that those 
are the only circumstances - malintent or error - under which a recipient 
would be entitled to have the State pay its fair share of the attorney fees! 
This is totally illogical. 
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Obviously, the statutes and case law should be interpreted to 
encourage full disclosure of third party actions to the State to enable the 
State to obtain its statutory lien. Logic would dictate that recipients who 
provide this full disclosure and cooperate with the State, should be entitled 
to have the State pay its fair share of the attorney fees under Subsection 
7(4). Yet, under Judge Quinn's interpretation, as urged by the State in this 
appeal, only those who defy the statutory lien or in error take possession of 
the settlement proceeds, would be entitled to their fair share while those 
who disclose and provide notice might forfeit a fair share. This would 
reward error and punish good. It makes no sense. 
C. Public Policy and Justice. 
The public policy of this State, based on statute and McCoy, 
is to have the State pay its fair share of a recipient's attorney fees as a 
procurement cost in obtaining its lien reimbursement. This public policy 
encourages full disclosure by recipients who have received Medicaid and 
have TPL claims. It saves the State an enormous amount of money by 
having private citizens and their attorneys do the work to procure the 
State's lien reimbursement. This should be encouraged and rewarded. For 
the State to do the work to recover thousands of personal injury claims 
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would require retaining outside counsel, or significantly expanding the 
Attorney Generals Office, all at great expense. 
Simple concepts of justice dictate that the State should not get 
a free ride at the expense of indigent recipients. The trial court's limitation 
on the fair share doctrine would destroy the philosophy behind the 
statutory framework and McCoy, and would be unjust to the mass of 
recipients. 
POINT HI 
Consent is Not Required 
THERE IS NO STATUTORY OR LOGICAL REASON 
WHY CONSENT SHOULD BE REQUIRED AS A 
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE STATE PAYING ITS 
FAIR SHARE OF A RECIPIENT'S ATTORNEY FEES. 
A. "Obtaining" Consent. 
The issue of "consent" continues to appear in this case. Post 
Houghton II, the State is still claiming that consent is required in some 
contexts in order for the Class II Plaintiffs to be entitled to have the State 
pay a fair share of their attorney fees. R. 1798 (43:19-44:5); 763. McCoy 
was very clear in addressing consent: 
Thus, in contrast to what the State suggests, the attorney fees 
portion of section (4) in no way limits the award of fees to 
recipients who obtained consent to pursue the State's claim. 
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McCoy 11 18 (emphasis added). 
Nothing in the statutory framework suggests a "consent 
requirement" as a condition to the State's obligation to pay its fair share. 
The only consent requirement is found in § 26-19-7( 1) (a), which references 
the State's consent only to filing the claim for the State's share of the 
settlement. It says nothing about consent as a condition precedent for the 
State's payment of its fair share of attorney fees. 
B. "Requesting" Consent. 
Despite the absence of a statutory requirement, should this 
Court "imply" a requirement that consent at least be "requested"? The 
State has stated in a prior oral argument that "requesting" consent was 
important because it alerted the State to the existence of a third-party claim 
and allowed it to monitor the case to protect its interest. 
A requirement that consent be "requested" is unnecessary and 
unwise. First of all, the statutory framework contains exceptionally strong 
protective language for the State. See Point LB. above. After Wallace, 
failure to notify the State of a third party claim would be, at a minimum, 
foolhardy and probably unethical also. Any third-party participation in 
such an effort would be counterproductive and risky since the State could 
still sue the third party for the full amount of the lien. See §26-19-7(2) (a). 
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"Notice" is far more important, and subsumes requesting 
consent. The State's legitimate concern is knowing about the recipients' 
third-party actions since the State has an interest in recovering its lien. If 
the State has timely notice of the action so that it can protect its interests, 
it is difficult to see what "requesting" consent, adds to the mix. Appellants 
therefore suggest that the inquiry focus on "notice," which is meaningful, 
rather than a formalistic requesting of consent, which is not meaningful and 
adds virtually no protection to the State's position. 
Of course, recipient's attorney must give notice to the State to 
preserve the claim for attorney fees, which trumps the State's lien, as noted 
in 26-19-5 (1) (b). The recipient's attorney fee claim is effective the moment 
the recipient enters into an agreement and notifies the State. The fee claim 
trumps the State's statutory lien as soon as the State is notified. 
POINT IV 
Notice Should be Required to Obtain a Fee 
IT IS REASONABLE TO REQUIRE THAT THE STATE 
HAVE NOTICE OF THE THIRD-PARTY ACTION PRIOR 
TO SETTLEMENT IN ORDER FOR THE RECIPIENT TO 
OBTAIN PAYMENT OF THE STATE'S FAIR SHARE OF 
ATTORNEY FEES. IF THE FAILURE TO IMPART 
NOTICE RESULTS IN THE STATE BEING PREJUDICED 
IN NOT OBTAINING ITS LIEN REIMBURSEMENT, 
THE FEE SHOULD BE FORFEITED. 
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It is a reasonable interpretation of the statute to require as a 
condition precedent to having the State pay its fair share of a recipient's 
attorney fees that the State have prior notice of the third-party tort 
settlement. After Wallace and SS, handed down in November 1998, it is 
clear that the State has a statutory first dollar priority lien on any 
settlement, even before payment to the recipient. U.C.A. § 26-19-5(l)(b). 
This lien was first so described in Wallace, after which it was reaffirmed in 
McCoy and Houghton II. When the applicant applies for Medicaid benefits, 
he/she signs an assignment and covenants to cooperate with the State in 
locating third parties who may be liable for the medical assistance paid by 
the State. This is fair and appropriate. See also 42 C.F.R. § 433.147. 
That being said, there should be no requirement that this notice 
must necessarily be provided by the recipient's counsel, or necessarily 
provided at the outset of the case. In many cases, it is not immediately 
evident to counsel that there is a Medicaid lien. It may take months to 
collect the records. The hospital staff or family may have had the injured 
person's relatives sign an application for benefits that is no longer 
remembered a year later when the client appears at the lawyer's office. In 
other cases, the Medicaid office may discover the existence of the potential 
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third party claim prior to counsel even being involved, or after counsel is 
involved but prior to contact being established with counsel. 
For Medicaid liens arising after Wallace was handed down in 
November of 1998, counsel would have to disclose the potential third-party 
claim at the earliest possible time after the facts become known. These 
rules and case law are sufficient to discourage intentional "hiding" of third-
party actions by counsel or recipients. 
It should, therefore, not make any difference to the integrity 
of the process whether or not the State learns of the potential third-party 
action from the recipient, recipient's counsel, or by some other method. 
The important thing is that the State receives notice, with the key issue 
being whether or not the State is prejudiced. If counsel neglects to give 
notice but the State has actual notice in time for it to protect itself, and 
receives full payment of its lien, the State should still be obligated to pay its 
fair share of a recipient's attorney fees. McCoy U 18, fn. 4. 
POINT V 
No Exception for State Using Its "Own Attorney" 
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE STATE'S CLAIM 
THAT USING "ITS OWN ATTORNEY" RELIEVES IT OF 
THE REQUIREMENT TO PAY ITS FAIR SHARE OF A 
RECIPIENT'S ATTORNEY FEES. 
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A. The Myth of the "State's Own Attorney". 
The State has repeatedly and ardently claimed in these 
proceedings that it could use "its own attorney" and avoid paying its fair 
share of attorney fees on its lien reimbursement. R. 763; 1798 at 44:15-19. 
Specifically, the State takes the position that under McCoy 1119, only items 
2 and 3 require that the State's recovery will be reduced by "reasonable 
attorney fees." McCoy H 19; R. 1798 at 45:4-9. Thus, any recovery that 
entails the State declining consent and using "its own attorney" (e.g., McCoy 
1119, item 1) will allow the State to avoid paying the recipient its fair share. 
For example, under this theory, if the recipient discloses a potential third-
party action to the State, the State may have "its own attorney" notify the 
TPL insurance carrier of its lien claim. The State would allegedly thus avoid 
having its recovery "reduced by reasonable attorney fees" because it is 
taking action against a third party for "which the State pays its own 
expenses." McCoy H 19, item 1. 
At the threshold, the State ignores § 26-19-5(l)(b), which 
prioritizes the recipient's attorney's fee claim above the State's claim for 
reimbursement. Beyond that, the State "using its own attorney" is a myth.9 
9 
Appellant's counsel has been doing personal injury work in Utah for 29 
years and has handled matters too numerous to count involving Medicaid 
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Counsel has never seen a single case where the State has ever contributed 
any meaningful effort to obtain the settlement. R. 895-897. 
B. No Statutory Basis for "Own Attorney" Exception. 
The statutory framework (Point LB. above) does not provide 
an exception where the State has "its own attorney." In fact, § 26-19-
5(1 )(b) states just the opposite, i.e., the State's lien has priority as to "all 
other claims to the proceeds, except claims for attorney's fees." 
C. Exception Would be Illogical. 
The key issue is whether the State gets its lien reimbursement 
as a result of a settlement procured by a recipient's efforts. Class II 
Plaintiffs are Medicaid recipients who retain a lawyer and procure a 
recovery from which the State is paid. If the recipient's lawyer did not 
procure the recovery, then recipient is not a Class II Plaintiff. 
To avoid future misinterpretation and appeals, the rule 
emanating from this Court should create a clear and strong presumption. 
lien claims. He is also in close association with other personal injury 
lawyers and often talks about Medicaid issues. He is not aware of a single 
case where the State has ever actively pursued a personal injury claim with 
its own attorney. A representative from the Attorney Generals Office from 
time to time will show up at a mediation involving a personal injury claim 
where it has a lien, or will send counsel a letter announcing the State's lien 
claim. However, these actions are protective of the lien and do not 
"procure" the TPL settlement. R. 1798:62. 
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If the recipient retains counsel to pursue a TPL claim, and there is a 
settlement/verdict, that recovery must be presumed to be "procured" by the 
recipient, which triggers the fair share rule. This will avoid dispute over the 
State's claim that its attorney somehow helped "procure" the settlement by 
providing lien notices, or a variety of other actions that in reality are 
designed to protect its lien interest, not to procure settlement. 
D. Such an Exception Would Allow Evasion of the Rule. 
To allow the State to avoid paying its fair share because it uses 
"its own attorney" would essentially allow evasion of the rule in McCoy and 
Houghton IL The intent of McCoy and Houghton II was to trigger a State 
obligation to pay its fair share of a recipient's attorney fees when the 
recipient secures a recovery that makes it possible for the State to obtain 
lien reimbursement. Both sides of that transaction have substance: the 
recipient goes to the trouble to hire an attorney, who does real work and 
makes a successful recovery; and the State receives real money as a result. 
This result is easy to evaluate, and the measurement of the 
State's attorney fee contribution of thirty-three percent (33%) of the lien 
is simple mathematics. The State proposes evading this responsibility by 
the technical "hiring of its own attorney." In practice, this means having 
an Assistant Attorney General write a letter to the tortfeasor's insurance 
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company notifying it of the State's interest. That is it. That act adds 
nothing to the substance of the transaction. It does not make it more likely 
that the recipient will get a recovery, or that the State will get its lien 
repaid. It simply ensures that all parties know of the State's interest. 
While this is appropriate for the State, it does not "procure" the tort 
recovery. For all these reasons, the "hiring own attorney" device should not 
excuse the State from paying its fair share. 
The record contains two classic examples of how the State 
might use the "own attorney" argument to avoid the just payment of its fair 
share of recipient's attorneys fees. Lawyer James D. Vilos submitted an 
affidavit that explains what happened in these two cases. R. 895. 
Mr. Vilos recounts the Houtz matter, where he accepted the 
case in October of 1995, investigated, and determined by March of 1996 
that there may be a Medicaid lien. He received a formal notice of such a 
lien on May 6, 1996, before the settlement, and during that time had many 
calls with an Assistant Attorney General, requesting that "the State pay its 
share of the attorney fees . . . of this recovery." R. 897 1f 4. He was 
informed that he was not entitled to attorneys fees without a "written 
contract with ORS." Id. The State never made a formal appearance "or 
participate[d] in any meaningful way in the litigation, or contribute[d] 
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anything meaningful to the settlement." R. 897 11 5. Mr. Vilos attaches 
two letters sent to the State in May 1996 reflecting these discussions. The 
Medicaid lien of approximately $17,791 was paid in full without any 
contribution to Houtzs attorneys fees. R. 898 H 6. 
Mr. Vilos posits another example in the case of one Kenny 
Nattress, which was litigated very hard for one and a half years before it was 
settled. R. 899. Mr. Vilos indicates that he was contacted sometime 
before June 10, 1996 and informed by Medicaid of its lien. ORS referred 
Mr. Vilos to an Assistant Attorney General who refused to discount the lien 
for attorneys fees. The State's lien was filed on June 10, 1996, the case 
settled about a month later and Medicaid was paid in full, approximately 
$32,000 for its lien. Mr. Vilos recounts: 
I can affirm that the State had absolutely no input or role in 
resolving this complex, and hard-fought birth injury case. 
Their attorneys were not involved in any way in the litigation 
or negotiation of this case or its settlement. Any statement or 
implication to the effect that the State resolved the case or its 
lien on its own is absurd. The State was only paid because 
plaintiffs' counsel was successful in litigating this case. 
R. 899 11 7. 
The Court should reject the State's argument that using "its 
own attorney" justifies not paying its fair share of the recipient's attorney 
fees. 
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POINT VI 
Cooperation is not Dispositive Unless Prejudice Results 
WHILE COOPERATION BY THE RECIPIENT AND 
COUNSEL IS REQUIRED, FAILURE TO COOPERATE 
SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE RECIPIENT FROM 
RECEIVING A FAIR SHARE OF HIS/HER ATTORNEY 
FEES FROM THE STATE IF NO PREJUDICE RESULTS. 
The issue of "cooperation" lurks in the background because 
Judge Nehring addressed the issue, and it will probably come up again on 
remand. Judge Nehring opined that the extent to which a recipient would 
be entitled to attorney fees might depend on the extent of "cooperation" by 
the recipient with the State. R. 1798: 47, 86. There are several reasons 
why the Court should reject this approach. 
McCoy makes it clear that a type of "cooperation" is required 
but lack thereof will not defeat the claim for a fair share if there is no 
prejudice. The Supreme Court noted: 
The State suggested at oral argument that McCoy should not 
be entitled to attorney fees because he failed to inform the state 
that Great American was the insured with whom he was 
settling Sevey's claim. We emphasize that a recipient has a 
duty to cooperate with the State in identifying and providing 
information to assist the State in pursuing any third party who 
may be liable to pay for medical care and services, [citations 
omitted] Keeping the State informed ensures that the State 
will not be prejudiced in its efforts to recover medical benefits. 
. . . In the instant case, McCoy failed to keep the State 
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minimally informed, but McCoy's lack of forthrightness did not 
prejudice the State's claim against the third party. 
McCoy, 1118, fn. 4 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, McCoy requires a minimal level of cooperation "in 
identifying and . . . pursuing any third party." That duty is clear and if 
failure therein prejudices the State in its recovery from a third party, no fee 
should be allowed. In the instant case, the State should assume the burden 
of proving the lack of cooperation if a recipient prevented the State from 
obtaining full recovery. Absent meeting that burden, the class member 
should be entitled to fair share attorney fees. 
Other than this "identifying" duty, no specific higher level of 
cooperation should be required by recipient to receive a full fair share. To 
require some higher, vague level of cooperation is simply to invite needless 
dispute. As long as the State recovers its lien through the settlement 
procured by the recipient and his/her counsel, the statutory minimum for 
a fair share by the State has been met. 
POINT VII 
Discovery Needed 
THIS COURT SHOULD ISSUE AN EXPLICIT 
DIRECTIVE TO THE TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW FULL 
AND COMPLETE DISCOVERY OF EVERY POTENTIAL 
CLASS II PLAINTIFF. THIS INCLUDES, AT A 
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MINIMUM, A RECIPIENT WHO HIRED AN 
ATTORNEY, PROCURED A SETTLEMENT AND DID 
NOT RECEIVE A THIRTY-THREE PERCENT (33%) FAIR 
SHARE ATTORNEY'S FEE CONTRIBUTION 
It would be beating a dead horse to remind this Court that 
there has been no discovery during the eight year life of this case. Each 
time on remand, the State has imposed a new round of objections and road 
blocks. These roadblocks need to be swept aside. Having full discovery of 
all possible Class II Plaintiffs on remand is critical to prevent a future 
possible Houghton IVappeal (Heaven forbid!). The Court would certainly 
want before it all issues of dispute, having first been reviewed by the trial 
court, as to who is and who is not a proper Class II Plaintiff, among the 
hundreds that are probably lurking out there. Providing full and complete 
discovery of all possible Class II Plaintiffs will ensure that this issue is fully 
litigated and considered by the trial court on remand, reducing the chances 
of a Houghton IV appeal. 
Additionally, providing full discovery at this juncture may 
resolve the case, and thereby prevent a future appeal. It may be that the 
number of potential Class II members is smaller than expected, or that the 
dollar amount of their claims is less than as anticipated. Possibly, when 
all of these "cards are on the table," the parties can even settle this matter. 
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That will never happen as long as there is uncertainty over these issues 
because of lack of discovery. 
Lastly, fairness dictates discovery proceed at this juncture. The 
Class II Plaintiffs, however many there may be, have waited many years for 
resolution. It is time to stop wrangling over technicalities about definitions 
and to get to resolution of the underlying substantive claims. 
Unless this Court takes a firm hand in resolving the scope of 
discovery, it is likely that there will be further objections by the State that 
will derail the process for at least another year or so. The most recent 
discovery was sought in October, 2002, and the Class II Plaintiffs are still 
waiting in April, 2004, 18 months later. 
CONCLUSION 
"Procuring a recovery" is the key fact under both McCoy and 
the statutory framework in determining whether or not a recipient is 
entitled to have the State pay a fair share of his/her attorney fees. When 
the State obtains lien reimbursement due to a settlement procured by a 
recipient's attorney, it owes the recipient a fair share of the attorney fees 
incurred in procuring that settlement. McCoy has determined this fair share 
to be thirty-three percent (33%) of the State's lien recovery, based on § 26-
19-7(4). 
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The "relatively broad reach" of Subsection (4) is not limited to 
those cases where the State seeks recovery directly against the recipient. 
Furthermore, this Court should reject any other artificial burdens or 
limitations on (and the statutory framework) McCoy such as requiring 
"consent," or carving out an exception if the State uses "its own attorney," 
or requiring "cooperation," other than in identifying and providing 
information about a possible liable third party. Carving out such exceptions 
or limitations to the fair share doctrine would destroy recovery of fair share 
attorney fees to almost all recipients and defeat the strong public policy 
behind that doctrine. 
Providing notice of a possible third party action or tort 
settlement is important in to qualify for payment of the State's fair share 
of attorney fees. However, the only requirement should be that the State 
receives notice from some source before settlement, and is not prejudiced. 
This Court should issue an explicit directive to the trial court 
to allow full and complete discovery of every potential Class II Plaintiff. At 
a minimum, this should include all recipients who hired an attorney, 
procured a settlement and did not receive a full fair share attorney's fee 
contribution. 
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A fair reading of McCoy in light of the statutory framework, as 
well as concepts of simple justice, dictate that this Court should uphold the 
principle that the State owes an injured Medicaid recipient a fair share of 
the recipient's attorney fees incurred in procuring a settlement from which 
the State obtains lien reimbursement. 
DATED this 20th day of April, 12004. 
ROBERT B. SYKES^ 
ALYSON E. CARTER 
Attorney for Appellants 
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NOV 3 ?. 2003 
SALr U V P COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL HOUGHTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE OFFICE 
OF RECOVERY SERVICES, THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND 
THE STATE OF UTAH (the "State 
Defendants") and ROD L. BETIT, 
Director of the Department of 
Health and Director of 
Department of Human Services; 
EMMA CHACONE, Executive Director 
of the Office of Recovery 
Services; JOHN DOES 1-50 and 
JANE DOES 1-50 (the "individual 
defendants"')", 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
CASE NO, 950907491 
On September 29, 2003, pursuant to notice and agreement of the 
parties, the Court heard oral argument on the holding and meaning 
of the case of State v. McCoy, 2000 Utah 39, 999 P.2d 572, and 
considered *{1) plaintiff's Motions for Scheduling Conference and to 
Compel Discovery, (2) plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel, to 
Strike Defendants' Response and to Enter a Default Judgment, (3) 
plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, (4) defendants' Motion for Protective 
Order and Request for Hearing, and (5) defendants' Motion for 
Decertification of Class Status. The Court earlier ruled on 
HOUGHTON V. 
DEPT. OF HEALTH PAGE 2 ORDER 
plaintiffs1 Motion for Appointment of Special Master for Discovery 
and Motion to Add Houtz and Nattress as Class II Representatives, 
and plaintiffs1 Itemized and Verified Bill of Costs. The Court 
earlier adopted defendants' version of the Order arising from the 
April 28, 2003, hearing before Judge Ronald E. Nehring. 
Robert B. Sykes of Robert B. Sykes & Associates argued for 
plaintiffs, and William F. Hanson of the Utah Attorney General's 
Office argued for defendants Department of Health, Office of 
Recovery Services, Department of Human Services, State of Utah, 
Rodd L. Betit, and Emma Chacone. 
The Cotirt has carefully read the McCoy case and cases related 
to it, has fully considered the oral argument of counsel on the 
holding andsmeaning of the McCoy case, and has fully considered the 
Motions listed above, together with all related exhibits and 
Memoranda. For the reasons stated at the hearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, as follows: 
1. The holding of the McCoy case is found in the last 
sentence of:paragraph 18 of that case, which states: 
We therefore conclude that under subsection (4) , when the 
State elects to recover directly from a recipient who has 
expressly excluded the State's claim from any attempt to 
recover from a third party, the State must pay the 
attorney fees incurred in procuring the State's share of 
the settlement proceeds. 
HOUGHTON V. 
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Under the McCoy case holding and its supporting facts, the 
State of Utah must pay attorney fees incurred in procuring its 
share of settlement proceeds where at a minimum an injured 
recipient of State medical assistance hires an attorney to recover 
damages from a third party, and the State elects to recover its 
claim directly from the recipient. 
2. The holding of the McCoy case governs this case. 
Accordingly, each Class II representative and member must meet the 
requirements of paragraph 18 of the McCoy case as construed above. 
3. Defendants1 Motion for Protective Order is granted. 
4. Plaintiffs1 Motions for Scheduling Conference and to 
Compel Discovery; plaintiffs1 Second Motion to Compel, to Strike 
Defendants1- Response and to Enter a Default Judgment; and 
plaintiffsf { Motion to Strike are denied. 
5. Defendants1 Motion for Decertification of Class Status is 
neither granted nor denied. The parties may conduct discovery that 
relates solely to the class issues in this case and spans the 
period beginning on October 26, 1994 and ending on September 29, 
2003. Plaintiffs may thereby pursue the identification of 
recipients who fall within the holding of the McCoy case as 
construed by this Order. Defendants need not, in response to any 
new discovery request generated pursuant to this Order, divulge 
personal information concerning any recipient because that 
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information is not related to the class issues in this case. 
Rather, defendants may identify any recipient by the number 
assigned to the recipient's file, and may excise personal 
information from any produced part of any recipient's file. 
6. Discovery related to class certification must be 
completed on or before January 31, 2004. 
7. At the conclusion of the discovery period set forth 
above, the parties shall submit Motions relating to class 
certification, decertification, or dismissal of the Complaint. 
Such Motions should be filed on or before February 20, 2004, at 
5:00 p.m. 
* 7^ 
Dated this ^O day of October, 2003 
IONY BT ©JINN \ *\ 
DISTRI^f COURT J U D G E V ^ S ^ * * ^ 
HOUGHTON V. 
DEPT. OF HEALTH PAGE 5 ORDER 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order, to the following, thisj? day ofJ^E&oker, 2003: 
Robert B. Sykes 
Matthew H. Raty 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
311 S. State, Suite 240 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William F. Hanson 
Mark W. May 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorney for Defendants 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
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